They have involved co-operation between the Iraqi intelligence and al-Qaeda operatives on training and combined operations regarding bomb making and chemical and biological weapons.

In this quote, Douglas Feith, a former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense, refers to the collaboration between Iraqi intelligence and al-Qaeda operatives. He suggests that there was a cooperative relationship between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda in areas such as training and combined operations. This includes the development and deployment of dangerous weapons, specifically bomb making and chemical and biological weapons. Feith’s statement emphasizes the perceived threat posed by this partnership, suggesting that it involved the sharing of expertise and resources in the creation of weapons of mass destruction.

Feith's comment underscores the concerns surrounding the links between the Iraqi government and terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, particularly in the context of the Iraq War and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The claim was part of the broader justification for military action, arguing that Saddam Hussein’s government was working with al-Qaeda to develop weapons that could be used against the West. This cooperation was seen as a critical point in the rationale for the invasion, as it raised fears about the potential threat posed by a partnership between a state actor and a terrorist group.

The origin of this quote comes from Feith’s involvement in the Bush administration’s defense policies, specifically during the lead-up to the Iraq War. Feith was one of the key figures pushing the narrative that Iraq had ties to terrorist organizations and was actively working on weapons of mass destruction. However, these claims were heavily scrutinized, and later investigations found no substantial evidence to support the direct collaboration between Iraq and al-Qaeda in the development of such weapons, leading to significant controversy.

Ultimately, Feith’s statement highlights the complexities and controversies surrounding the intelligence that informed the decision to go to war. It represents a key moment in the debate over the validity of intelligence assessments and the use of those assessments to justify military action, particularly the claims regarding Iraq’s ties to terrorism and weapons development.